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LAW, POLICY, AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Mark G. Yudoj'*
LEGISLATED LEARNING: THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF THE
AMERICAN CLASSROOM. By Arthur Wise. Berkeley: University of
California Press. 1979. Pp. xvii, 219. $10.95.

Legislated Learning is a trendy book that registers high on the
Richter scale of academic tremors over law, lawyers, and legal process.1 It is also a very bad book. It is a pastiche of themes and erudite quotations unblemished by harmonizing influences. The first
task of a reviewer of Legislated Learning closely resembles that of a
good editor. Before analysis may proceed, hypotheses must be distilled and then distinguished from each other. Passing references,
inconsistent with the major themes of the book - for example a
spanking new discussion of federalism near the end of the work (pp.
202-03, 206-08) - need to be banished from the mind. Once the
reader mentally edits the book to render it more comprehensible,
four interrelated arguments emerge. These vary in persuasiveness
from the plausible to the absurd.
At one level, the author regurgitates much of the writing and
thinking of Donald Horowitz2 and Nathan Glazer,3 and contends
that courts are not competent to set education policy in the guise of
deciding concrete disputes between parties (pp. 75-77, 118-85). To
Wise and others, the best examples of incompetence involve construction of open-textured state and federal constitutional provisions
by the judiciary (pp. 3-6, 131-39, 155-85), though unlike Glazer,
Wise rests his argument more on concerns about competence than
about the legitimacy of judicial intervention. A second and related
theme is that dispute resolution in the public schools has increasingly
been "legalized" as educational decisions are appealed to courts or
state administrative agencies and as legal models of dispute resolu• Marrs McLean Professor of Law, University of Texas. B.A. 1965, LL.B. 1968, University of Pennsylvania. - Ed.

I. See Book Review, 5 J. EDuc. FINANCE 481 (1980).
2. See D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977).
3. See N. GLAZER, COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (publication forthcoming); Glazer, Towards an Imperial Judiciary?, 41 Pus. INTEREST 104 (1975); Glazer, Should Judges Administer
Social Services?, 44 Pus. INTEREST 64 (1978).
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tion are mandated within the schools themselves (pp. 75-77). 4 Rule
and procedure overwhelm discretion (p. 131). And ultimately this
results (or may result?) in the increased "bureaucratization of the
American classroom" (the book's subtitle) and in the loss of local
control (pp. 48-49).
The third theme, a critique of major policy innovations of the last
fifteen years, moves well beyond criticisms of judicial intervention
and the adversary method of resolving disputes. Rather, it treats judicial, legislative, and administrative decision making as birds of a
feather. Such agencies, in Wise's view, frequently express policies
through rules and procedures, and those policies are wrongheaded
for a variety of reasons. They may embody an unduly restrictive
view of the goals of education, they may ignore resource limitations
and gaps in the technology of producing educational outcomes, and
they may overlook distortions introduced through bureaucratic implementation (pp. 55-61). Most importantly, in pressing for equal
educational outcomes for various groups of children, policymakers
have increasingly moved well beyond specification of inputs and
procedures. The result is that many policies fail.
Wise argues that the problem lies with "a legalistic conception of
education and the school" (p. 52). Repeal of bad legislation or the
overturning of bad court decisions will not suffice because the flaw
lies in the ways that politicians, policymakers, and judges think
about the world. Legal rationality is but one example of a rational
model, and the author believes that rational models (be they economic, scientific, organizational, or whatever) are often misguided
(p. 79). Rationality too often leads to "hyperrationalization" (pp. 4748), a goal-oriented consideration of the fit between means and ends
that produces "logical" solutions that are not firmly rooted in reality
(pp. 65-66, 115). Put simply, the mind of the decision maker superimposes rational schemes on disorderly educational organizations
and on the subtle and complex art of teaching (pp. 78-103).
The incompetence theme is primarily taken up in chapter four.
Wise relies extensively on Donald Horowitz's book, The Courts and
Social Policy 5 (pp. 120-26). The research is rather one-sided, with
no references to scholars like Abram Chayes6 or Laurence Tribe7
4. See Kirp, Proceduralism and Bureaucracy: .Due Process in the School Setting, 28 STAN.
L. REV. 841, 851-59 (1976); Yudof, Procedural Fairness and Substantive Justice: .Due Process,
Bureaucracy, and the Public Schools, in FUTURE TRENDS IN EDUCATION POLICY 109 (J.
Newitt, ed. 1978).
5. See D. HOROWITZ, supra note 2, at 255-98.
6. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281
(1976).
7. See, e.g. , Tribe, Seven Pluralist Fallacies: In .Defense ofthe Adversary Process -A ~eply
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who defend judicial involvement in complex institutional litigation. 8
Wise finds courts incompetent for a number of reasons. Courts are
charged with making decisions and creating policy in the absence of
information about the workings of educational institutions and the
likely consequences of intervention (p. 121). Courts are too rationalistic, too insensitive to rough-and-tumble politics, and too bound to
theories of rights. The piecemeal character of litigation (p. 123), the
tendency to eschew compromise (p. 121), the necessity of narrowing
issues and goals (pp. 123-24), the difficulty of relying upon socialscience evidence (pp. 145-46), and the focus on the extreme cases for
general rules (p. 124) may lead to unreliable results. There are fewer
participants in the judicial process than in the legislative process (pp.
121-22), and those who do participate have an incentive to withhold
information that would be damaging in an adversary proceeding.
One part of the argument is that courts are less competent factfinders than legislatures. But for all of Wise's analysis of the New
Jersey School Finance case (pp. 155-85) and his reliance on
Horowitz's study of Hobson v. Hansen 9 (pp. 135-39), he only succeeds in showing that courts often are inept fact-finders. Whether
legislatures are less inept is a different question, a largely empirical
one which cannot be answered with polemical assertions. 10 A recent
study by Michael Rebell and Arthur Block, comparing legislative
and judicial processes in the education field, found that issues frequently were more thoroughly and intelligently discussed in the judicial forum. 11 Legislative hearings tended to be ritualistic as
proponents and opponents of the bill called their witnesses. The caliber of testimony in judicial proceedings, while hardly overwhelming, tended to be better because more witnesses were called and
because the witnesses were more carefully questioned. For the very
reason that courts tend to be more rationalistic and less oriented toward politics (a point Wise makes), one might well expect that courts
would more thoroughly air factual issues. And as Abram Chayes
lo Justice Rehnquist, 33 MIAMI L. REV. 43 (1978).
8. See Kirp, School Desegregation and the Limits ef Legalism, 47 PUB. INTEREST 101, 12225 (1977).
9. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), ajfd en bane sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175
(D.C. Cir. 1969). See Hobson v. Hansen (Hobson II), 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971). See
generally Michelson, For the Plaint!lft- Equal School Resource A/location, 7 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 283 (1972); O'Neill, Gray & Horowitz, For the Defendants - Educational Equali(i•
and Expenditure Equalization Orders, 7 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 307 (1972).
10. See Chayes, supra note 6, at 1304-16.
11. See M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICYMAKING AND THE COURTS (publication forthcoming).
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has noted, modem courts in public interest litigation are not as limited by rules of evidence and other devices in their fact-finding as
they were in the past. 12 Of course, to say that courts are equally or
more competent fact finders than legislatures is not to say that they
should be entrusted with public policy decisions. But Wise's point is
largely limited to judicial competence, and he ignores the question of
whether it is legitimate for courts to make decisions premised on
"legislative" facts.
A second branch of Wise's competency argument is that courts
must and should justify their decisions in terms of legal authority.
This means that courts may deduce educational solutions from laws
and precedents while ignoring the realities of the situation (pp. 7576, 122-24): "In interpreting laws as a means of solving educational
problems, the courts focus on explicit . . . phenomena, on formal
rather than informal structure, on rationale rather than reality" (p.
122).
In large measure, this point is well taken. There is always the
danger that judges will craft decisions that meet the highest standards of legal justification, but will reach uncommonly silly results.
But Wise sweeps far too broadly. If a court is construing a statute
and it employs reasonable means to discern the legislative purpose,
what more should one expect? The solution is properly deduced
from the law, and if the result is awkward, the legislature should
change the law. More to the point, Wise's observations fly in the
face of the legal realism of the last fifty years. The problem may be
more that a court can manipulate constitutional and statutory text
and precedents to reach a solution that it believes is wise, than it is
that such authorities command an unwise s6lution. Dr. Wise is
somewhere back in the nineteenth century in his conception of the
formalism of the legal process; 13 indeed, the formalists of that age
may appear to be legal realists by comparison with him. And had
Wise been more concerned with the legitimacy of judicial intervention, he might have realized that it is the very lack of strictures on
judicial decision-making that has caused critics of judicial activism
to charge the courts with usurping legislative functions. 14
12. See Chayes, supra note 6, at 1296-98.
13. See generally G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 41-67 (1977); K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 38-41 (1960); White, The Evolution ofReasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279 (1973).
14. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST (1980); L. LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT'! (1975); Greenawalt, i)iscretion and Judicial J)ecision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 CoLUM. L. Rev. 359
(1975); HART, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble
J)ream, II GA. L. Rev. 969 (1977).
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The third branch of the competence argument concerns the implementation of remedies in complex school litigations. The argument is powerfully, if cryptically, made:
The legal process also contains its own theories of human behavior and
of organization. Ordering the school administrator or teacher to alter
his behavior is deemed sufficient to induce behavioral change. When
the order is to cease a behavior, it may work; when the order is to
perform a behavior, it may not. Schools are assumed to be organized
according to the Weberian ideal of hierarchical authority. [P. 76.]

The difficulty is that Wise does not elaborate upon this promising
theme and that he overlooks the work of Christopher Stone, 15 William Clune, 16 David Kirp, 17 and others 18 who have thought about
the implementation of court decisions. Familiarity with the literature would have lead to at least four additional qualifications and
interpretations. First, in an age of complex institutional litigation,
the law, in animistic fashion, may fail to distinguish the alteration of
individual behavior from the alteration of institutional behavior.
Even in the fields of contracts and torts, institutional and individual
liability may have very different policy implications. What deters an
individual from engaging in some behavior may not deter an organization.19 The results may be unintended and serendipitous. Second,
the concepts of fault, individual responsibility, and choice that underlie legal sanctions may become attenuated when the sanctions are
imposed on an organization with thousands of employees, with various roles, with no single person responsible for many decisions. 20
Third, legal sanctions may have an insignificant effect on the behavior of school organizations because they appear to occur almost randomly and are balanced against professionalism, bureaucratic
demands, public pressure and the like. 21 Finally - and this is an
important point missed by the author - the nature of the judicial
15. C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE. SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR
(1975). See CORPORATE AND GOVERNMENTAL DEVIANCE (M. Ermann & R. Lundman eds.
1978).
16. Clune, Wealth Discrimination In School Finance, 68 Nw. U. L. REV. 651 (1973). See
also M. FEELY, P. PIELE, E. HOLLINGSWORTH & W. CLUNE, III, Si:;HOOLS & THE COURTS
(1979).
17. Kirp, supra note 4; Kirp, Race, Politics and the Courts: School Desegregation in Sall
Francisco, 46 HARV. EDUC. REV. 572 (1976).
18. E.g., Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 HARV, L.
REV. 428 (1977).
19. See generally C. STONE, supra note 15; Berman, The Study Of Macro- And Micro-Implementation, 26 Pua. POLICY 157 (1978).
20. See generally C. STONE, supra note 15; Elmore, Organizational Models Of Social Pro•
gram Implementation, 26 Pua. POLICY 185 (1978).
21. See generally S. SARASON, THE. CULTURE OF THE SCHOOL AND THE PROBLEM OF
CHANGE. (1971); C. STONE, supra note 15.
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decision may be critical to the manner of its implementation. If the
decision is relatively clear and not strongly opposed by important
constituent groups, and if its implementation does not conflict with
bureaucratic values, then the decision may well be implemented in
hierarchical fashion with little deviation. 22 In my own work I have
argued that procedural requirements, for example, are more likely to
be implemented (at least in form if not spirit) than substantive requirements such as protection of student rights or abolition of school
prayers. 23
'
Legislated Learning's second major theme is that rules and formal procedures have come to dominate public schooling in America,
and that every substantive and procedural requirement limits "the
discretionary performance of school officials by proscribing or prescribing ends or means" (p. 131). Wise lays particular emphasis on
the Supreme Court's Goss v. Lopez 24 decision requiring an informal
hearing for students suspended for less than ten days (p. 133). At
this point the argument becomes more complex. If "legalization"
refers to the tendency "to discover, construct, and follow rules," 25 the
phenomenon is not limited to judicial interventions (p. 51 ). When
Congress guarantees access to student records and requires hearings
to contest alleged inaccuracies in the records, 26 when state legislatures enact public sector collective bargaining -laws applicable to
teachers, 27 and when school boards adopt codes of student rights and
responsibilities, 28 they are contributing as much to the legalization
process as court decisions. Thus, Wise equates all policies embodied
in rules and regulations with the process of legalization (p. 61 ). And
thus all hierarchically imposed policies, not just court decisions, restrict the autonomy of school teachers and administrators. This argument has clear implications for democratic constraints on public
22. See Yudof, Legalization ofDispute Resolution, Distrust ofAuthority, and Organizational
Theory: Implementing Due Process far Students in the Public Schools, - Wis. L. REV.
(1981) (in press). See generally A. GOULDNER, PATTERNS OF INDUSTRIAL BUREAUCRACY
(1965); S. SARASON, supra note 21.

23. See Yudof, supra note 22.
24. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
25. J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 21 (1971) (not cited or discussed by Dr. Wise).
26. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1970) (Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act).

21. See generally L. McDONNELL & A. PASCAL, ORGANIZED TEACHERS IN AMERICAN
SCHOOLS (1979); D. WOLLETI & R. CHANIN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF TEACHER NEGOTIATIONS (1974).
28. See M. CHESLER, MAINTAINING ORDER AND ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION: THE DETROIT UNIFORM CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT (1976); EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
CODES OF STUDENT DISCIPLINE AND STUDENT RIGHTS (1975).
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schools and for the appropriate role of professionals in education.
These implications will be discussed below.
For the moment, however, it is sufficient to note that Wise seriously mischaracterizes a pervasive problem of political, organizational, and legal theory. 29 He believes that the assumption
underlying legalization is that "[r]ules and procedures are superior to
the exercise of judgment as means to promote equal and fair treatment in schools" (p. 56), and that frequently "hyperrationalization"
results:
Hyperrationalization occurs when conformity to norms is not achieved
by the procedures and rules imposed - when procedures are followed
but the norm of fairness is not necessarily attained; when rules are
obeyed but the norm of equality is not necessarily attained. [P. 66.]

What Wise misses is that the successful operation of any complex
organization involves a balancing of discretion and rules. On the
on~ hand, rules establish standards for behavior, provide guidance to
the novice or the marginally competent, and promote uniformity of
treatment. On the other hand, those on the firing-line ("street level
bureaucrats" in the phrase of Weatherly and Lipsky)30 need to be
able to exercise their best judgment in individual situations if they
are to accomplish policy objectives. This is as true for teachers and
school administrators as it is for police officers, social workers, and
postal employees. Rules and discretion are complementary elements
in the achievement of policy objectives. Identifying the equilibrium
point is a vexing problem and the subject of considerable dispute.
But Wise unnecessarily confounds analysis by perceiving the problem as a choice between a government of laws and a government of
men.
In his zealousness to demonstrate the extent of legalization in the
schools, the author also distorts the law. 31 For example, he admits
that the Goss decision, "taken by itself, is a limited intervention into
the affairs of a school" (p. 132). Essentially, an administrator need
only inform the student of the alleged violation of school rules and
listen to his or her side of the story. Indeed, Professor Kirp has argued that Goss may represent a shift away from equating due pro29. See, e.g., W. MOMMSEN, THE AGE OF BUREAUCRACY 99 (1974); R. POUND, AN INTRO·
DUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 54 (1961). See general/.)• K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE (1969); T. LOW!, THE ENO OF LIBERALISM (1969); P. SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND
INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE (1969); J. SHKLAR, supra note 25; Weatherley & Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucrats and Institutional Innovation: Implementing Special-Education Reform, 41 HARV, L.
REV. 171 (1977).
30. Weatherley & Lipsky, supra note 29.
31. See Thurston, Book Review, 5 J. EDUC. FINANCE 481, 482 (1980).
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cess with adversarial hearings and toward less formal dialogues in
the resolution of school disputes. 32 But Wise says that the limited
reading of Goss "may be deceptive, since its reasoning may easily be
extended" (p. 133). Obviously, any reading of a case may be deceptive; cases acquire meanings as they are reflected upon and employed as precedents. Wise, however, gives no examples of any
extensions of Goss. He only cites language in the opinion that suspensions for ten days or longer may require more demanding procedures (the law of the land well before Goss) 33 and a law review
article written a year after Goss. 34 He completely ignores recent
Supreme Court decisions limiting the definitions of property and liberty interests protected by due process requirements. 35 He does discuss Board of <;urators v. Horowitz, 36 but in a most disingenuous
way. In that case the Court drew a distinction between disciplinary
and academic suspensions, and held the due process clause inapplicable to the latter. Wise states that the Court found the process
given "sufficient," and discusses the views of three justices who disagreed in part with the majority (p. 135). Any lawyer worth his· or
her salt would recognize Horowitz and the corporal punishment
case37 as clear limitations on the reach of Goss. It is as if the author
wrote much of the chapter on "legalizing the schools" (pp. 118-54)
around the time of Goss, and then refused to reconsider his conclusions as contrary evidence emerged. His discussion of these
Supreme Court cases also stands as a monument to the poor quality
oflegal research found in much of the book. The chapter could have
been much improved had Wise referred to the standard constitutional law texts and casebooks.
The author's discussion of the impact of legalization on the classroom is schizophrenic. Without citing any empirical evidence, he
asserts that teachers "increasingly" have been treated as bureaucrats:
"If schools are not performing well, they are instructed to tighten
specific operations - a phenomenon we call 'bureaucratic rationali32. See Kirp, supra note 4, at 864: Wilkinson, Goss v. Lopez: The Supreme Court as School
Superintendent, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 25.
33. See generally Buss, Procedural Due Processfar School Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 545 (1971).
34. Dessem, Student Due Process Rights in Academic Dismissals.from the Public Schools, 5
J. L. & EDUC. 277 (1976).
35. See, e.g., Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341
(1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). See generally Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New
Property''.· Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative Stale, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445
(1977).
36. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
37. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
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zation.' If teachers are not performing well, they are to be precisely
instructed on what to teach and how to teach - we call this view
'rationalistic teaching' " (p. 81 ). "Rationalistic teaching," then, is
clearly a cost of the legalization and bureaucratization processes.
Wise next wishes to show that schools do not conform to rational
bureaucratic models, and hence are not amenable to rational bureaucratic reforms. In order to demonstrate this point, he reverses
field:
Consensus on goals is lacking. Formal power may be centralized, but
its influence at the classroom level is attenuated. . . . Increasingly,
analysts question whether schools are or can be closely coordinated,
what the effects of planning are, and how interdependent the components of school organization are.
Teachers, of course, do not . . . readily accept a rationalistic characterization of their roles. . . . The rationalistic mode of thinking may be
dissonant with the reality of teaching. Substantial evidence suggests
that the primary reason is that the rationalistic conception of teaching
is perceived by teachers as not salient, useful, or relevant to the demands of their work. [Pp. 90, 96.]

Thus Dr. Wise would have it both ways. Legalization and
bureaucratization are increasingly entering the classroom, with destructive effects on education, and yet the rationalistic model (of
which legalization is a part) is ineffective because decision makers in
the hierarchy find it difficult to reach down to the classroom level.
The difficulty arises because of both the loose organizational nature
of schools and the resistance of teachers to such central direction. 38
Hence legalization is a villain both because it does and does not have
an impact on classrooms.
Dr. Wise's third major theme, the critique of major policy innovations of the last fifteen years or so, need not long detain us. The
author is surely on secure ground in suggesting that such scientific
management schemes as management by objectives, zero-based
budgeting, and management information systems have not been
great successes in the public schools (pp. 12-19). He is also correct in
arguing that statutes and court decisions addressed to improving educational outcomes (reading skills, good citizenship, economic selfsufficiency, etc.) are doomed to failure given the presently indeterminate relationship between educational resources and educational
outcomes (pp. 7-12). This is particularly true ifthere is no consensus
38. See generally Weick, Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems, 21 Ao.
Sci. Q. I (1974); March, American Public School Administration: A Short Anal)'Sis, 86 ScH,
REV, 217 (1978).
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on appropriate outcomes, if those outcomes are difficult to measure,
and if it is undesirable to treat education in such a crudely instrumental fashion (pp. 115-17). His critique of minimum competency
testing legislation (pp. 24-27, 68) is particularly compelling:
One result, and a second example of wishful thinking [the first example
is the belief that federal compensatory education expenditures will
boost student achievement], has been that state legislatures and state
courts have been requiring by law specified levels of performance on
the part of school-people and schoolchildren. Competency-based
graduation requirements and the rulings for "thorough and efficient
education" demand that the schools produce outcomes which they may
not be able to achieve. [P. 68.]

The lesson may be obvious, but perhaps Wise is correct in asserting
that many legislatures and some courts have not learned it: a law or
court decision cannot successfully command what it is presently impossible to do. So too, Wise is surely correct in suggesting that limited technology, scarcity of resources, the unnecessary narrowing of
goals, bureaucratic structure, and limited knowledge of educational
processes may all cut against successful policy innovations (pp. 6569).
If there is a weakness in this aspect of Legislated Learning, it lies
in Wise's hyperbolic description of the movement toward regulating
education outcomes through law and legal processes. For example, I
have no doubt that many of those who voted for Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 196539 intended to improve the educational plight of poor children and to work toward a
breaking of the nexus between poverty and educational failure. In
this regard the experience with title I has been far from satisfactory
(pp. 8-12, 68). But it may be unfair to characterize title I in such a
unidimensional fashion, for the goals of title I may have been many
and fluid. Perhaps the Congress had in mind providing financial
assistance to school districts with large concentrations of poor children. Or perhaps it wished to create the opportunities for learning
without great concern about the ultimate result. Further, title I programs are formulated by local school districts, subject to the basic
requirement that the monies be spent on children with severe educational deficiencies. Congress did not mandate particular educational
outcomes. Indeed, it did not even mandate particular educational
offerings. Rather, at best, it made money available to local school
districts to allow them to define appropriate outcomes and the means
of achieving those outcomes. I do not think that I am quibbling over
39. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965), 20 U.S.C. §§ 236-241k (1976 & Supp. III 1979)
(the act has been substantially amended since 1965).
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words in asserting that this is a far cry from the meanings that one
typically associates with such polemical terms as "mandate[dj" (p. 3)
and "legislated lear:ning."
The discussion of the New Jersey school financing case, Robinson
v. Cahil!, 40 is far more persuasive. Dr. Wise makes out a strong case
that the New Jersey Supreme Court, in construing the "thorough
and efficient" education clause of the state constitution, shifted from
an equal educational opportunity approach to an adequate achievement approach. Such judicial decisions, as I argued eight years ago,
are wrongheaded; they do not create intelligible standards for school
officials and they seek to accomplish what present education technology cannot achieve. 41 But Wise overstates the case by suggesting
that cases like Robinson are the norm. Other state school financing
cases have not taken the Robinson tack. 42 And it certainly confounds reality to assert that "the U.S. Supreme Court has tended to
shift concern from equality of educational opportunity to adequacy
of educational achievement" (p. 3). The author cites Brown v. Board
ofEducation 43 for this proposition (pp. 3-5). Yet there is not a shred
of evidence in the confused desegregation cases of the 1970s to link
racial balance remedies with a constitutionally identified goal of improved student achievement. 44 Perhaps the Justices hope for such a
result, and certainly many commentators pray for it, but modern desegregation cases simply do not turn on concerns about educational
outcomes.45 Wise also cites San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez ,46 a case involving a fourteenth amendment challenge
to the Texas school financing law, as evidence of the movement toward focusing on education outcomes (pp. 5-6). Yet the plaintiffs
lost in the Supreme Court, and this reality overwhelms Wise's unper40. (Robinson I) 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973); (Robinson II) 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65
(1975); (Robinson III) 67 N.J. 35,335 A.2d 6 (1975); (Robinson IV) 67 N.J. 333,351 A.2d 713
(1975); (Robinson V) 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976); (Robinson VI) 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d
457 (1976); (Robinson VII) 70 N.J. 464, 360 A.2d 400 (1976).
41. Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TEXAS L. REV, 41 I, 419-34
(1973).
42. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971);
Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615,376 A.2d 359 (1977); Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793,
537 P.2d 635 (1975) (relief denied); Olsen v. State ex rel Johnson, 276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139
(1976) (relief denied). See generally Clune & Lindquist, Serrano and Robinson: Studies i11 the
I mplemelllatio11 of Fiscal Equity a11d Effective Educalio11 i11 Stale Public Law Litigalio11, in M.
FEELY, P. PIELE, E. HOLLINGSWORTH & W. CLUNE.supra note 16, at 67; Levin, Currell/ Tre11ds
in School Fi11ance Reform Litigation: A Commelllary, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1099.
43. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
44. See Yudof, supra note 41, at 439-44.
45. Id. See ge11erally Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reaso11ed Elaboratio11,
a11d Social Scie11ce Research i11 the Supreme Court, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 57 (1978),
46. 411 U.S. I (1973).
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suasive discussion of dicta in the majority opinion and the views of
the dissenters. Moreover, Wise appears to equate a concern for the
impact of school financing laws and racial segregation on achievement with the notion of mandating particular educational processes
and outcomes. In all of the cited decisions, this is manifestly not the
case.
The fourth theme of Legislated Learning, by far the most radical,
is that virtually all forms of policymaking (Wise is unclear on this)
are premised on rationalistic models, and that policymaking is thus
doomed to failure. At the simplest level, Wise questions the value of
systems of thought in resolving school problems.47 He believes that
legal, economic, bureaucratic, professional, or other rational models
are inadequate bases for making or implementing policy choices. A
major reason for his skepticism is that public schools themselves do
not operate in accordance with rational models:
Educational policymakers behave as though they believe that schools
operate according to the rationalistic model. That model postulates
that schools operate by setting goals, implementing programs to
achieve these goals, and evaluating the extent to which the goals are
attained. The goal-oriented process is assumed to be effectuated
through a bureaucratic distribution of formal authority and work responsibility. It is further assumed that the attainment of goals provides
sufficient incentives to drive the system. . . . Policies which promise
to increase productivity and equity are imposed on the existing structure of the school in the anticipation that they will improve education.
. . . What may be wrong with the rationalistic model is that those
who are attempting to change or control schools by reference to it are
implicitly basing their actions on a set of assumptions that may be different from the assumptions, opinions, and the theories under which
the schools actually operate.
The failure of schools to conform to the rationalistic model may be
seen in the failure thus far to create models which help explain the
process of schooling empirically. [Pp. 78-79.]

Policymakers, then, tend to impose an artificial order on a highly
chaotic reality, and this explains why "so far, mechanisms of control
in schools have not ensured compliance with long-range plans" (p.
89).

If Wise limited himself to this proposition, his thesis would be
debatable, but still well within the bounds of current debates in
political science. Such eminent political scientists as Aaron Wildav47. See A. WILDAVSKY, SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER: THE ART AND CRAFT OF POLICY
(1980); Lindblom, The Scienceof"Muddling Through," 19 PUB. AD. REV. 79 (1959).
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sky,48 Paul Peterson,49 and Charles Lindblom50 (none of whom are
cited by the author) have vehemently warned against taking rational,
theoretical constructs from the various disciplines and applying them
with full force to complex organizations. Lindblom speaks of the
"science of muddling through" 5 I as perhaps the best way to view the
behavior of people within organizations. Wildavsky prefers the marketplace and the political processes to determination by experts of
what would be just and effective. 52 But, alas, Dr. Wise goes much
further. He does so in two respects. First, by equating all policies
embodied in legal rules with rationalism, he suggests that even legislation, the result of rough and tumble politics, is fatally flawed.
Wildavsky and Lindblom's point is far different. They are suggesting that intellectualization and expertise are to be distrusted and
that we should rely on poltical and market processes to establish policies. Put somewhat differently, they argue that political and market
processes are rational means of governing education, and hence they
would object primarily to policy made by the self-declared expert in
accordance with some model of human behavior. Thus they might
object to judicial intervention within a constitutional framework, or
to adminstrative intervention supposedly grounded in public administration theory, but they would not object to laws enacted by elected
bodies pursuant to democratic principles. Second, in a sort of vulgarized version of Horkheimer53 and Oakeshott, 54 Wise also appears
to deny the efficacy of instrumental reasoning - indeed, in contrast
to Wildavsky, he is worried about "common sense rationality" (pp.
69-70). Wise declares that he is concerned about a policymaking
process that "views education as the means by which the child is
prepared to take his place in society" (p. 106).55
48. See A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 47.
49. See P. PETERSON, SCHOOL POLITICS CHICAGO STYLE 128-39 (1976).
50. See generally C. LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY (1965); Lindblom,
supra note 47. .But see C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS (1977).
51. Lindblom, supra note 47, at 88.
52. See A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 47.
53. See M. HORKHEIMER, ECLIPSE OF REASON (1947); R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS (1975).
54. See M. OAKESHOTT, RATIONALISM IN POLITICS (1962). For a trenchant application of
Oakeshott's perspective to constitutional law, see Nagel, Book Review, 127 U. PA. L. REV,
1174 (1979).
55. The school and the teachers are the instruments which will transform the child into a
productive, literate, law-abiding citizen. The notions that education is important in its
own right, that education may lead a person to challenge rather than accept society, and
that education is a gift which society bestows upon the individual are absent from the
instrumental view of education. . . . (A]s the influence of policymakers becomes more
pervasive, the risk is that the instrumental goals will become the exclusive goals.
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The vital thrust of Legislated Learning therefore is quite simple:
The problem with public schools is that they are subject to educational policies. Presumably this message undercuts the notion that
centralization is the evil; for even school boards, superintendents,
and principals may be capable of formulating educational policies
through instrumental reasoning. To govern is to err. And be aware
that Wise, unlike Professor Tribe, is not simply warning us about the
dangers of a rampant instrumentalism. 56 Tribe worries that objective reason (instrumental means-ends analysis) tends to weed out
soft, unquantifiable variables, to assume that the ends are static, to
ignore the fact that means may redefine and become ends, to ignore
interrelationships among ends, and ultimately to deter us from
thinking about the goodness or justice of the ends themselves (subjectiv~ reason). Wise, however, appears opposed to reflection;57 he is
troubled that "[t]he pressures to solve educational problems through
policy interventions appear unremitting" (p. 199). But what is the
alternative to thinking about the deficiencies of public education and
about the most efficacious ways of addressing those deficiencies?
Wise fails to understand that people can apply reason and common
sense to problems in the real world that are not governed by neat
rules of some rationalistic model. Any reflection is rationalization of
a type. The alternative, I suppose, is to go "with the flow," a substitution of a secular Taoism for reflective judgments. And Wise comes
very close to this, implying that if only there were no policy, children
would be instilled with the desire to learn and to develop to their full
potential. Without policy, there would be no conflict between the
preferences of the individual and those of the group: all would be a
part of a grand, romantic unity. Kenneth Arrow has described this
mysticism:
The tension between society and the individual is inevitable. . . .
[S]ome sense of rational balancing of ends and means must be understood to play a major role in our understanding of ourselves and our
social role. Let me illustrate by presenting or, more precisely, carica. . . The rationalistic paradigm fails to make a place for the school as an institution for
learning; it fails to make a place for a humanistic teacher; and it fails to provide a place
for education conceived as self-development.
Pp. 106, 117.
56. See Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth .Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617 (1973). See generally Tribe, Ways Not to Think
about Plastic Trees: New Foundationsfar Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974); Tribe,
Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHILOSOPHY & Pue. AFF. 66 (1972).
51. q. Nagel, supra note 54, at 1183 (" 'Rational' conduct, which should not be confused
with 'sensible' or 'efficient' conduct, is 'behavior deliberately directed to the achievement of a
formulated purpose and governed solely by that purpose.'" (footnotes omitted)).
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turing some thought tendencies. We have one, loosely called "the new
Left thought," not so new perhaps. . . . Bakunin and Sorel had spoken to the same point many years ago. But it is a real one. There is a
demand for what might be termed sincerity, for a complete unity between the individual and the social roles, the notion that somehow in
an ideal society there would be no conflict between one's demand on
oneself and one's responses to the demands of society.58

Wise takes us to this ideal society and away from any real society. In
his ideal world, he substitutes consensus for authority. 59
Since Wise is not yet operating in the New Jerusalem, the implications of his analysis are profoundly undemocratic. If democracy
requires that self-controlled citizens have the opportunity to influence policy and to select leaders, 60 then presumably elected leaders
in Congress, in state legislatures, and on local boards of education
should determine educational policies. Otherwise, there is no process of consent, and the professionals are free to do what they please.
And if this is the case, then it is of the utmost importance that elected
officials have the ability to control or at least to direct the behavior of
those responsible for delivering educational services. In other words,
if elected officials cannot demand that unelected public servants behave in conformity with established public policy, then the electorate
itself has lost control of the public enterprise. Wise has simply gotten carried away with his objections to judicial intervention and legalization ("legal rationality") by not distinguishing them from the
systemic needs of any democratic order. Furthermore, he ignores
the fact that many policies do work. Elected officials (and administrative agencies subject to legislative oversight) decide such matters
as compulsory attendance, minimum curriculum requirements,
grade structure, and the like. To be sure, this is a far cry from regulating education outcomes. But the point is that public officials routinely set policies that are followed. It also is paradoxical that Wise
presumably would allow government owned and operated schools to
exist, and yet deny to the public the power to direct those schools.
But Wise takes this position because he equates political choice and
compromise with a mindless rationalism.
Finally, Dr. Wise's war on rationalism would bring even more
power to professional educators. The argument against rationalistic
thinking is usually employed to defend the political processes from
assaults by those who claim greater expertise: educators, lawyers,
58. K. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 15-16 (1974).
59. See id. at 69.
60. See D. BOORSTIN, DEMOCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 10 (1974); C.
DEMOCRATIC PROSPECT (1962).
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public administrators, and the like. Legislated Learning stands the
argument on its head by using it to attack political outcomes and to
ensure that professional educators are the effective winnets. Teachers are to eschew the abstract and the oversimplified in favor of a
concept of responsibility "for a whole, real child" (p. 97). They are
to translate "formal goals into personalized objectives" (p. 99).
Teachers, in short, will obliterate rampant instrumentalism and magically synthesize the interests of the social group, the parents, the
children, and the educators. This means that the professionals
would assume the powers that Dr. Wise would take away from the
policy-makers. The "solution" would simply exacerbate the primary
obstacle to improving education, which is that professionalism too
often isolates public schools from accountability to the citizenry. As
Cohen and Farrar have noted,
There are real political imbalances in the governance of American
schools, which contribute to the poor performance of political reforms
to increase participation. But the real imbalance is not political in origin. It results more from a social division of labor that encourages the
specialization of work, the professionalization of roles, and the partitioning of authority. In advanced industrial societies this solidifies professional power in education, as well as discouraging active parental
involvement. ...
. . . Professionals gain economic returns, social satisfaction, personal status, individual identity, and group power from their roles.
And parents, most of whom have occupations providing similar rewards, have seen their educational role narrowed and redefined. 61

Thus the possibility of political remedies for school deficiencies is
already remote because "the imbalance in school power does not
have political roots." 62 Wise, through his nai've brand of anti-rationalism, would narrow even further the universe of political solutions
to the problems of public education.
How can Dr. Wise's proffered solution be so wide of the mark?
Perhaps it is because he seems to have no understanding Of the etiology of the movement toward more law and procedures in the governance of public schools. For Wise, those who advocate reform
policies are very much like the activist Supreme Court Justice in
Walter Murphy's The Vicar of Christ: "He simply - and totally disbelieved in law. To him law was not man's groping toward general principles upon which to build a better society, but a means to
achieve, and instantly, the particular social reform that was that day
61. Cohen & Farrar, Power to the Parents? 72, 92 (1977).

INTEREST

62. Id.

The Story ef Education Vouchers, 48 Pua.
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troubling his new-found conscience." 63 Legalization and rationali•
zation strike like lightning as reformers and those in favor of in•
creased accountability, productivity, and equity press their claims on
schools through the legislative and judicial processes. But why have
they chosen to assert such claims at this time? Have not such de•
mands existed for more than a hundred years? How does one ac•
count for popularly elected legislatures moving in this direction along with federal and state judges? The answer lies, I believe, in
the increased distrust of school authorities in the post• World War II
era. If school officials may not be trusted to exercise properly their
discretion, then legal rules and procedures may be adopted as means
of constraining that discretion.
The distrust of officialdom may have many causes, and some
may lie outside the public school setting. 64 Part of it may have to do
with the equality revolution and the revolution of rising expecta•
tions. As particular groups demand equal treatment and as people
demand that government satisfy more of their wants, inevitably the
public service products of government come in for greater scrutiny.
The trend is reinforced by inflation and other economic problems
that make taxpayers more wary of public services. The questions of
accountability and bang for the buck come to the fore as people ask
whether the public or the private sector can most efficiently satisfy
their wants. Thus, it is no longer enough for government to provide
more police officers, teachers, and social workers; rather, people wish
to know whether crime rates will be reduced, whether learning will
improve, and whether family problems are being solved.
Under these circumstances, the legalization process can be un•
derstood as an attempt to reinforce weakening authority links in the
governing process. Legalization is a response to the crisis of legiti•
macy, an attempt to make decisions appear legitimate by reaching
them through the appropriate formal processes. Legitimacy through
democratic consensus and expertise are perceived as failing. Fur•
ther, legalization may be perceived as an attempt to reestablish a
sense of community by requiring a discourse among the governors
and the governed. The intimacy of face-to-face relations is often lost
as the population and the public sector expand, as decision making
becomes increasingly bureaucratized and centralized, and as power
flows from traditional mediating institutions such as families,
churches, and interest groups. The paradox, however, is that a com63. W. MURPHY, THE VICAR OF CHRIST 147 (1979).
64. Much of the concluding discussion is taken from Yudof, supra note 22.
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pelled intimacy through legal processes appears to be the very antithesis of a community of shared values. The more reliance that is
placed on legal processes, the more difficult it may be to achieve a
true sense of community in which public officials are trusted to make
decisions consistent with prevailing social, political, and economic
norms.
There are a few specific factors that may contribute to the distrust-legalization-distrust cycle in public education. First, student
tests scores have declined, and studies have questioned the effectiveness of pouring additional resources into public schools. Second, the
"equality revolution" and the "revolution of rising expectations"
have reinforced the notion that public schools should not only educate, but also provide the means for socioeconomic advancement.
Public schools rarely can keep up with such rising expectations.
Third, as the school population levels off and fertility declines, fewer
adults have children in the public schools. Adults who receive no
direct benefit from public schools may be more critical of the performance of those institutions. This distrust may be reinforced by
sharply increasing local and state tax burdens and by the rise of
more militant teacher organizations. Finally, the civil rights movement, the failure of many Great Society social programs, and a
growing anti-professional bias may also contribute to the decline in
public trust in public schools.
In the end, public schools will not be very joyous places unless
some balance is achieved between rule and discretion. They will
"reflect an increasingly anomic world in which private entitlement
backed by formal procedure apparently arises to fill a vacuum left by
the withering of that certain spirit we may call community." 65
Nonformalism is premised on trust, and trust is what is lacking in
the school environment. But despite Wise's diagnosis, formalism did
not create that mistrust in the first instance: it is merely a manifestation of the underlying lack of community. The reestablishment of
trust is a precondition to the establishment of informal structures.
And because Wise fails to identify this problem, his solutions are
unlikely to resolve it.

65. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural .Due Process, in NOMOS
XVIII: DUE PROCESS 126, 149 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977).

